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FEDERAL SUPPORT OF DOMESTIC ATOMIC POWER
DEVELOPMENT-THE POLICY ISSUES
JAMES L. MORRISSON*
INTRODUCTION

The possibility that controlled nuclear fission could produce useful
energy was recognized early in 1939.1 During World War II developmental effort was focused on production of the bomb. Since the war,
the U. S. atomic power program has grown to substantial proportions.
By June 30, 1958, there were in operation in the United States one full
scale civilian power reactor and seven civilian power reactor experiments, with a total rated electrical capacity of over 77,000 kw, as well
as a number of military propulsion reactors and reactor experiments.
There are currently planned fourteen power reactors in addition to
the one now in operation. These present plans, if fully carried out,
would result in a U. S. nuclear power capacity of over 1,300,000 electrical kilowatts by the end of 1963.2
Policy decisions concerning the domestic atomic power program typically reflect the interaction of a number of sometimes conflicting considerations. These include technical considerations such as the optimum size, type and location of reactors, the relative emphasis on construction of prototype power plants as compared with basic research
and development, the proper timing of prototype construction, and the
optimum use of scientific manpower; fiscal considerations such as the
overall permissible level of federal expenditures; political considerations such as the desirability of public or private ownership of nuclear
power stations and the proper allocation of responsibility tetween the
executive and legislative branches; and foreign policy considerations
such as the need to protect the competitive position of American reactor manufacturers in foreign markets, and the importance of establishing or maintaining American primacy in nuclear engineering as a
matter of national prestige and as a means of demonstrating our determination to use atomic energy for peace and not war. Personalities
have sometimes played a major role. It is not surprising that the
debate on these issues has at times been both heated and confused.
* Member, Ginsburg, Leventhal Brown & Morrisson, Washington, D.C.;
Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, AEC, 1953-57.
1. See SmyiTm, ATOIIc ENERGY FOR M3IARY PURPOSES 24-25, 31 (1945). On
May 1, 1939, three French scientists filed an application for French patent for
a nuclear reactor for the production of energy. See Application of Commissariat a 1 'Energie Atomique, AEC Patent Compensation Board, Docket No. 18.

2. 23 AEC SEMIANN. REP. 93, 335-36 (1958). This would amount to about %
of 1% of total electric generation capacity. ATomIc INDUSTRIAL FORUm, INC.,
A GROWTH SURVEY OFTHE AToMIc INDUSTRY, 1958-68, at 25 (1958).
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The central fact is that nuclear power plants now in operation
are high cost plants, and that predicted power costs for plants now under construction are substantially in excess of costs of efficient conventional plants.3 The AEC has set, as a target which it believes optimistic
but feasible at the present rate of effort, the achievement in ten years
of nuclear power costs which will be competitive in some parts of the
United States.4 The staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
has set a comparable goal 5 Presumably, it would take an appreciably
longer period of time before nuclear costs were enough lower than
conventional costs to result in any measurable savings to power consumers. From the domestic point of view the nuclear power program
as presently conducted will, under these estimates, be a burden on
the economy for something like ten years; it will not begin to produce
measurable benefits for some time after that.
This central fact has become increasingly evident during the past
year or so. In 1954 and 1955 there was some tendency to feel that
competitive nuclear power in the United States was just around the
corner; many of the "first generation" of demonstration power plants
were initiated on the basis of rosy cost estimates, which have risen
very substantially as the hard realities of the complex engineering
6
task involved began to be apparent.
Thus it is now clear that the major problem for perhaps the next
ten years is to provide for the performance of the necessary research
and development and to decide how the heavy cost burden of that
research and development should be shared. During that stage, con3. See, e.g., ATOMInC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., A GROWTH SURVEY OF THE ATOMIC
INDUSTRY, 1958-68, at 25 (1958); Proceedings of a Conference sponsored by

Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. and National Industrial Conference Board, VIANAGEMENT AND ATOMC ENERGY, 348-66

(July 1958); NUCLEONICS 47, 49 (Jan.

1958). As is often pointed out, these estimates of costs of plants not yet operated are subject to a wide margin of error. E.g., Roddis, How Nuclear Cost
Estimates Are Made, MANAGEMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY 265-70 (July 1958);
NUcLEoNIcs 47, 49, 50-53 (Jan. 1958). Dr. Lane, of the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, estimates present nuclear power costs at 10 + or -

kwh. NucLEoNics 47 (Jan. 1958).

6.5 mills per

4. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., AUTHORIZATION

HEARINGS 215-16 (1958); see Bibliography, p. 243 infra. Commissioner Vance
explained that by "competitive" he meant that a utility, deciding to build a

plant ten years from now, could conclude that it would achieve costs over its

lifetime that would be as cheap as those of a conventional plant in areas of
relatively high cost conventional power. Id. at 215, 222-23.

5. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSED
ExPANDED CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM 1 (Comm. Print 1958) set the

goal "to demonstrate economically competitive nuclear power in the United
States by 1970." Since the AEC objective refers to the date when the decision
to construct a plant is made, while the JCAE objective refers to the date when

a plant has been in operation long enough to demonstrate power costs, the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy target date is, if anything, a year or two
earlier than AEC's.
6. See, e.g., ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., A GROWTH SURVEY OF THE

ATOMIC INDUSTRY, 1958-68, at 31 (1958); MANAGEMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY,
N
supra note 3, at 265-70.
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cern with subsidies, or with competition between public and private
power, for example, should be secondary. On the other hand, at such
times as nuclear power becomes more economical than conventional
power, the question of how the benefits of this new development
should be shared will become dominant. There may at times have been
a tendency to allow jockeying for position, looking toward a situation
which perhaps may arise ten years hence, to distract attention
from, and interfer with, performance of the immediate task of research
and development.?
In considering the particular issues discussed below, this distinction
between immediate and long-range problems needs to be kept constantly in mind.
THE BASIC STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Atomic Energy Act of 19548 reflects certain fundamental decisions which established guide posts for atomic power development.
The full scope and meaning of those decisions, and the importance of
the problems still to be resolved, will become more apparent in the
light of the discussion in subsequent portions of this article.
(1) Surrender of the Government Monopoly: Atomic Energy in the
United States originated as an exclusive federal government monopoly. The 1954 act, by removing the legal prohibitions against private
ownership of nuclear reactors, made possible an industrial atomic
power program. It declares the policy that the development of.atomic
energy shall be directed so as to "strengthen free competition in
private enterprise" 9 and it permits private persons, under license, to
own and operate reactors and possess fissionable material. 10 The legislative history emphasizes the importance which Congress attached to
a vigorous industrial program of atomic power development."
7. "The injection of the public-private dispute into the atomic field at this
time is unnecessary and unfortunate.

During the period of the next years

when the best that can be expected is uneconomic demonstration projects,
public and private power agencies have a common, not a conflicting, interest
in the program. A truce is possible on terms which will not prejudice the
respective role of private and public power groups and which wili not inhibit
either group in its stand on the broad principle of the proper roles of government and industry in a democratic society." Final Report of the Twelfth
American Assembly, Arden House, Columbia University, Reprinted in AToMs
FOR POWER: UNITED STATES PoLIcY IN AToIVac ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 155 (Arden
House Report) (1957).
8. 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-281 (Supp. V, 1958).
9. 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (Supp. V, 1958).
10. 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2133-34 (Supp. V, 1958).
11. "[W]e do not believe that any developmental program carried out solely
under governmental auspices, no matter how efficient it may be, can substitute
for the cost cutting and other incentives of free and competitive industry."
H.R. REP. No. 2181, S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
During the consideration of the 1954 act this decision was unsuccessfully
challenged as premature, in the absence of a comprehensive report and study
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The surrender is, however, incomplete. Not only is industrial atomic
power development subject to federal licensing regulation; it is intimately bound up with and profoundly affected by, the policies and
activities of the federal government taken in its proprietary capacity
as the exclusive owner of fissionable materials and the sole or principal supplier or purchaser of important materials and services.
(2) Continued Federal Support of Atomic Power Development:
The act, however, does not abandon the atomic power field to industry.
It authorizes and directs the AEC to arrange for the performance of
research and development relating to the use of atomic energy for
"the generation of usable energy, and the demonstration of the practical value of [reactors] for industrial or commercial purposes," either
"through its own facilities" or "by private or public institutions or
persons." Continued performance of research and development by
the AEC was deemed indispensable.' 2
(3) No AEC Control of Utility Accounts or Rates: In surrendering
the federal monopoly over a technology developed with federal funds,
and in licensing private ownership of reactors, Congress could have
required that the licensee submit to federal accounting control and
rate regulation to ensure that the benefits of the lower costs anticipated
from the new technology were passed on to consumers. However, the
act confers no such authority; it preserves the normal jurisdiction of
federal, state and local agencies over rates, accounting, and financial
13
practices.
(4) No Federal CommercialPower Sales: The 1954 Act was a defeat
for proponents of federal generation and distribution of atomically
produced power on a commercial basis as a form of competition to
bring private rates down-an "atomic TVA."
of its social, political, economic and international effects. E.g., Minority Views
of Congressmen Holifield and Price.
12. 68 Stat. 927 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2061 (Supp. V, 1958).
13. 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(b), 2018-19 (Supp. V, 1958); see
also 68 Stat. 954 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2233(c) (Supp. V, 1958). During consideration of the 1954 act proposals were made to subject all AEC commercial

licensees to the provisions of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 854 (1920), 16
U.S.C. §§ 825 (a)-(u) (1952), establishing federal control over accounting
practices of licensees of hydroelectric projects. See Minority Views, H.R. REP.
No. 2181, S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1954); 100 Cong. Rec. 11567
(1954) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). As adopted by the Senate and as
enacted in 68 Stat. 960 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2019 (Supp. V, 1958). However, the

amendment was limited to licensees who transmit or sell electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce, and thus merely confirmed existing FPC
authority. 100 Cong. Rec. 11712-13 (1954).

AEC licensees are not required, as a condition of their licenses, to transmit
technical or financial information to the AEC, except for purposes of the
national defense, health and safety. 42 U.S.C. § 2133-34 (Supp. V, 1958). A
license is not an "arrangement" under § 2182 and does not give AEC any rights
to inventions resulting from the licensed activities. Opinion of AEC General
Counsel, 10 C.F.R. § 8.1 (1956).
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A Senate amendment specifically authorizing the AEC to engage in
the generation and sale of electric energy was dropped in conference. 14
And section 44 of the act, while authorizing sale of electricity produced from production and experimental facilities, expressly disclaims
any authority in the AEC to engage in "the sale or distribution of
energy for commercial use."
This prohibition applies only to the AEC. The act specifically provides that any federal agency now or hereafter authorized by law to
engage in the production, marketing or distribution of electric energy
may be licensed by the AEC to construct power reactors for the primary purpose of producing electric energy for disposition for ultimate
public consumption. However no other federal agency has been given
general authority to produce, transmit and sell atomically produced
electric energy.15
The decision in 1954 as to the AEC's authority was, however, not
clearcut. The Commission is authorized by section 44 to sell to the
public energy produced incident to its operation of research and development and production facilities. Under this authority the Commission may construct "large-scale" demonstration power reactors and
sell the energy from them. 16 All power reactors built for some time to
come-perhaps ten years-are expected to be regarded as research
and development facilities. Thus the act in its present form could be
construed as authorizing the AEC to construct, and sell power from,
nuclear plants having an aggregate capacity of many millions of kilowatts.17 Once such a program was embarked upon, it might not be
difficult to amend the act to permit its continuation into the period
when nuclear reactors became commercial facilities. This possibility
has had an important influence on the debates on the nuclear power
program.
Foms OF FEDERAL AssIsTANcE

Federal assistance to private atomic power development has in fact
14. H.R. REP. No. 2666, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954).
15. The act leaves existing public and cooperative utilities free to operate
power reactors on the same basis as private utilities. For example, TVA
within its geographic area can produce and market nuclear power on the same
basis on which it now produces and markets energy from coal. The act thus
leaves the existing balance between public and private power unaffected.
Marks, Public Power and Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTEMaP.
PRoB. 132 (1956).

16. Conference Report, H.R. RE. No. 2666, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954).
Section numbers referred to in the text are to the original act. Sections which
will be discussed below and their United States Code section numbers are:
31(2051), 44(2064), 103(2133), 104(2134), 152(2182), 161(2201), 169(2209),
170 (2210), 251 (2016), 261 (2017).

17. Whether AEC would have incidental authority to construct transmission
lines may be more doubtful, especially in view of the carefully delimited
authority of § 2201r.
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been given at an increasing rate. Such assistance has taken three
major forms:
(a) Performance of research and development of general benefit;
(b) Specific assistance to particular reactor projects;
(c) Materials and services furnished or acquired.
At present the preponderant part of AEC expenditures for power
reactor development takes form (a) and a significant amount takes
form (b). While it is clear that AEC undertakings to furnish certain
materials and services and to purchase special nuclear material constitute an important form of assistance, the relative importance of
this assistance as compared to the other two forms is less easy to assess. As the number of reactors increases this form of assistance could
become the most important of all.
A. The StraightAEC Program
The atomic power industry derives indirect benefits from the AEC's
general research and development in the physical and biological
sciences, 18 and from the military reactor program. But it derives direct and immediate benefits from the civilian reactor program. According to the AEC, that program currently involves annual expenditures
of over $200 million; 19 by contrast expenditures on the cooperative
program are a little over $20 million. Government spending on such
a large scale for development to promote a non-military objective
is unusual. 20 The immediate relationship between this government
18. A few of the many examples are fundamental physics and chemistry,
special reactor materials, uses of reactor-produced isotopes, biological effects
of radiation, etc., and the steps taken by AEC to ensure an adequate supply
of special reactor materials such as beryllium and zirconium, and facilities
such as test reactors.
19. AEC submitted these figures for civilian reactor development:
Operating costs, Civilian
1957
1958
1959
Power Reactors (in millions of dollars)
Government Program ...................... 52.8
74.5
90.9
Cooperative Program ....................... 1.5
8.2
22.7
General Engineering ...........................
22.2
30.1
44.4
Materials and Services ..........................
3
32.8
36.6
Total operating expenses ....................... 76.9 145.7 194.3
HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 291. AEC's budget for

AUTHORIZATION

power reactor construction during fiscal year 1959 approximates $29 million.
(Source: AEC Division of Finance).
20. While nearly half of industrial research and development in the United
States is federally supported ($3.1 billion out of $6.5 billion), the great bulk of

this is for military purposes. NSF 58-10, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS IN
AmEicAw INDUSTRY, 1956 (May, 1958).
Significant non-military federal research and development expenditures of direct benefit to industry include
those of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (1956 actual, $71
million; 1958 estimated, $86.5 million); and the Bureau of Mines (1956 actual,
$15.6 million; 1958 estimated, $20.2 million). By far the greatest part of these
expenditures, however, are characterized as research rather than development.
NSF 57-24, FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE, VI THE FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS 1956, 1957, AND 1958, at 29, 37-38, 43-44 (1957).
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program and private power reactor projects is clear: most of the private projects are directly derived from and related to one or more
AEC projects. 2 1 Indeed the assistance which some of these projects

receive under the cooperative program is quite small by comparison
with the benefits which they derive from directly related work financed under the straight AEC program. 22 It is thus clear that the
principal AEC assistance to the atomic power industry comes from the
AEC's own program.
B. The CooperativeProgram
Beginning in January 1955, the AEC embarked on what was for it
a new venture in government-industry relationships. This was the
Power Demonstration Program. The program has been described in
detail elsewhere. 23 It is an exercise of AEC authority under section
31 to make arrangements for the conduct of research and development activities. It is embodied in a group of contracts between the
AEC and utility organizations (publicly, cooperatively and privately
owned) by which the AEC, in support of a reactor project proposed
by the utility and approved by the AEC as capable of contributing to
the development and demonstration of nuclear power, obligates itself
to extend financial assistance of a specified amount and character. It
has two branches. In one group of contracts, with privately owned
utilities, the utility bears the major part of the cost of the project,
Related AEC Program
Type of Reactor
21. Project
Yankee
Consol. Edison
Carolinas-Virginia
Vallecitos
Comm. Edison
Northern States

Pacific Gas &El.

Pressurized Heavy
Water

PWR (also Navy
submarine program)
Same (also AEC production reactors)

Boiling Water

Borax 1, 2, 3, 4; EBWR

Pressurized Water

EBR-I, EBR-II
HRE-I, HRE-II
(British gas-cooled power reactor; AEC research
and production reactors)
22. For example, the PRDC contract obligates AEC to provide $8.2 million
of assistance. See note 35 infra. By comparison AEC's own expenditures for
fast breeder reactor research, development and construction totaled over $37
million through fiscal year 1958 and are budgeted at approximately $35 million
for fiscal year 1959. (Source: AEC Division of Reactor Development). Similarly the $7.9 million assistance contracted for the Yankee project is dwarfed
by the over $100 million spent by AEC on the Shippingport PWR and other
pressurized water reactor research and development.
It makes little difference to a private reactor owner whether research and
development is conducted by AEC under the straight AEC program, or as
specific assistance to a private proposal, so long as it is performed and the
results are made available. Indeed the two programs may at times be interchangeable. Thus when Congress refused to authorize funds to carry out the
PRDC contract, AEC was able, with the complete knowledge and approval to
perform the identical work called for by the contract. See AUTHORIZATION
HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 378-84 (1958) and references there cited.
23. See Green, The Strange Case of Nuclear Power, 17 FED. B.J. 100 (1957).
PRDC
Penna. P. & L.
Florida

Fast Breeder
Homogeneous
Gas-cooled heavy
water moderated
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owns the reactor, and bears the risk of cost overruns; the AEC's contribution is subject (with minor exceptions) to a fixed ceiling. In the
other group, with publicly and cooperatively owned utilities, the AEC
bears all or the major part of the costs of the nuclear reactor, owns the
reactor or part of it, and bears all or many of the risks of cost overruns.
In each case, the AEC receives, and may transmit to others, full technical and economic information from the project, and substantial
patent rights in the nuclear field. Since 1957, all appropriations for
such cooperative arrangements must first be authorized by Congress,
and the basis for each arrangement must be submitted to the JCAE,
and lie before it for thirty days, before the arrangement becomes
effective.2
The AEC now has assistance contracts for six privately owned reactors, involving a maximum of 465,000 kilowatts of electrical capacity.
Approximately $57.2 million is presently obligated by the AEC. The
A.EC costs range from 11 to 34 per cent of the total; thus the AEC dollar buys from three to nine times as much nuclear capacity under this
25
part of the cooperative program as under the straight AEC program.
The forms of AEC assistance under this part of the program have
varied somewhat from time to time. Basically, however, they consist
of two. First, the AEC obligates itself to pay for research and development costs, up to a fixed ceiling. This may now include research
and development both prior to construction and during operations; it
may be performed either by the AEC in its facilities or by the proposer
in private facilities; but it does not include any direct payment of
construction or operating costs. Second, the AEC agrees to waive, for
a limited period (usually five years of operation) certain charges
which it would otherwise impose for the use of fuel and heavy water. 20
24. Fiscal Year 1958 Authorization Act, 71 Stat. 409 (1957).
25.
Capacity AEC ObligationEst. Total Cost
Project
(EKW)
(millions) (millions)
Yankee
110,000
$ 7.9
$ 61.8
PRDC
90,000
8.2
77.7
Northern States
62,000
7.0
29.8
Florida
46,000
12.4
56.3
Carolinas-Virginia
17,000
14.7
42.9
Penn. P. L.
150,000
7.0*
12.5*
Total

465,000

$57.2

$280.9

* Phase I only.
Source: 23 AEC SEMiANN. REP. 357 (1958) (Column 1); Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriation on the Supplemental
Appropriation Bill, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1051-52 (1957)

(Columns 2

and 3).
26. In addition to these direct benefits the proposer may get certain intangible benefits from having the status of "contractor" rather than a licensee.
Thus he may be eligible to receive classified information concerning military
or foreign reactors which is not available to private industry generally under
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The AEC also has cooperative contracts for four AEC owned reactors, with a total electric capacity of 119,500 kw and an estimated
AEC obligation of $96.8 million. The AEC costs range from 66 to 92
per cent of the total.27 While owned by the AEC, these reactors will
be operated by public and cooperative utility bodies as part of their
regular utility systems, and those bodies will have the option to purchase the reactor after a specified period of operation. In one case the
utility will incur normal operating costs and take the steam from the
reactor; in the other three the AEC will bear all operating costs and
sell the steam to the utility at a "dump" rate.
C. Materialsand Services

The AEC is by statute the exclusive owner of fissionable materialuranium 233, uranium 235, and plutonium-used as fuel in power
reactors.2 9 It is in fact the principal or sole source of supply of other
materials and services needed for power reactor projects, including
source material (natural or depleted uranium and thorium), heavy
water, and chemical processing services. It is authorized to lease
fissionable material, to sell or lease other materials and services, and
to buy back plutonium and uranium 233, at charges which must
30
generally be reasonable and non-discriminatory.
The costs of these various materials and services constitute an important part of the total costs of nuclear power. Current estimates
indicates that fuel costs for the present generation of reactors amount
to some thirty to forty per cent of the total power cost,31 and are
the Civilian Access Program. 10 C.F.R. Part 20 (Supp. 1957). And, by virtue
of the formal assignment of his contract for administration to a particular
AEC field office, he may enjoy a closer liaison with AEC activities related to
his project than is the case for purely private projects. ABC has sought to
minimize these differences in treatment, but it may still be true that the best
way to get cooperation from the federal government is to ask it for money.
27.
Capacity AEC ObligationEst. Total Cost

Project

(EKW)

(millions)

(millions)

Consumers
RCPA

75,000
22,000

$51.5
11.4

$ 77.7
13.9

Piqua

12,500

12.3

16.3

Chugach

10,000

21.6

23.5

$131.4
$96.8
119,500
Total
Source: See note 25 supra. The Shippingport PWR project, entered
into prior to enactment of the 1954 act, is in many ways similar to
these four projects. Because it originated as an AEC proposal, however, it is usually treated as part of the straight AEC program.

28. Fiscal Year 1958 Authorization Act, § 111; Op. Comp. Gen., No. B-13,
6015, May 7, 1958, CCH ATOMIc ENERGY L. REP. ff 3044 (1958).
29. 68 Stat. 929 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V, 1958).
30. 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2076, 2093, 2201(m) (Supp. V,
1958).
31. ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., A. GROWTH SURVEY OF THE ATomViIc INDUs-
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perhaps two to three times the cost of coal. 32 The payments to the
AEC for use and burnup of fuel and for chemical processing and the
credits from the AEC for plutonium are the principal elements in these
costs, perhaps accounting for as much as two-thirds of the total fuel
cost.33 The plutonium credit alone, at the presently effective minimum
price of $30 per gram, may amount to two or three mills per kwh, depending on the type of reactor.M
The potential importance of the plutonium buy-back alone is illustrated by three examples. First, a reduction in the plutonium price
from $30 per gram to $12 per gram would result, over a ten year period,
in a net increase in operating costs for the PRDC reactor of more
than twice the total AEC assistance under the cooperative contracts. 35
Second, at the $30 price, the AEC's total costs for plutonium bought
from U. S. reactors by 1963 could approximate $20 million,36 a figure
which approximately equals the present annual expenditures on the
cooperative program. 37 Third, assuming the projections for nuclear
power in 1980 given by the AEC's former Director of Reactor Development, the annual cost to the United States of buying the plutonium
from those reactors at $12 per gram could exceed $1 billion. 38
1958-68, at 26 (1958), gives the following estimates for large power reactors
starting operation in 1960 (in mills/kwh):

TRY

High
Capital Charges
Fuel Costs
Operation and Maintenance

10.3
8.4
1.0

Low
8.2
5.4
1.0

Alt. Low
8.2
3.6
1.0

Total
19.7
14.6
12.8
The fuel cost is a net figure after allowing credit for plutonium bought by AEC.
by AEC.
32. Roboff, Reducing the Cost of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, MANAGEMENT AND

Aroiv c

ENERGY

271 (1958).

EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Status
and Prospects of Nuclear Power, an Interim Survey (July 1958); testimony
of Michael Michaelis, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong.,

33. See NUCLEONICS 51, 63 (Jan. 1958).

1st Sess. 131 (1958) [Hereinafter 202 Hearings].
34. AToIvc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., GROWTH SURVEY, op. cit. supra note 31,
at 63, uses an overall figure of 1 mill for each $10 of plutonium price. Roboff,
note 32 supra, treats that figure as applicable only to some types of reactor.
NUCLEONICS 50 (Jan. 1958) uses for pressurized water reactors 1.3 mills for
an $18 price difference (about .7 mills per $10). By comparison the total average fuel cost for coal-fired plants is said to be 2.7 mills/kwh. NUCLEONICS
53 (Jan. 1958).
35. The cost increase is over $18 million. Matter of PRDC, Docket No.
F-16, Acker Exhibit No. 26. The total AEC assistance, including waiver of
fuel use charges, is $8.2 million.
36. 1,300,000 (kw capacity see p. 195 supra) X 365 (days) X 24 (hours) X
.80 (plant factor) X 3 (mills/kwh) = $27 million. At 2 mills the figure is $18
million.
37. See note 19 supra.
38. Davis and Roddis estimated in 1957 that by 1980 installed nuclear kilowatts would total 227.2 million kw and annual nuclear output would total
1285.9 billion kwh. Latest Prospects for Economic Nuclear Power, CCH ATOMIC
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As a recent study has pointed out:
The salient feature in U. S. nuclear fuel economics at this stage is the

predominant position of the government in determining all major process
costs, except those for fuel preparation and fabrication. While this predominance has been evident in principle since the passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, the practical effect in its many ramifications is just
beginning to become apparent.39
It is not clear whether the AEC's present prices and charges for

these materials and services involve a subsidy. The AEC has generally
sought to avoid subsidized prices and charges. But the establishment of
those prices and charges calls for complex economic analysis; the
basis on which they have been established have not always been
clearly stated, and some of the underlying data is still classified. In
any event, however, the existence of a guaranteed government supply
or market is an important form of assistance. The following examples
are illustrative of the possibilities for subsidy which exist:
(1) While the AEC may have a present need for plutonium for
weapons purposes and for certain experimental purposes, it is difficult to see any basis on which it can have such a need for fuel purposes, since the Government has no present intention of engaging
in nuclear power production. The extent to which it will have a future
need for plutonium for any of these purposes which cannot be satisfied
by its own production plants will depend largely on international
and military conditions which are difficult to predict. Moreover, at
present it is not known whether plutonium can be economically used

as a fuel.40 Thus it is impossible to tell what a proper fuel price should
be.
Despite these uncertainties, the AEC is not only a compulsory purchaser of all reactor-produced plutonium, but it has guaranteed a
minimum price for plutonium through July 1963. 41 The fluctuations
which the guaranteed price has undergone do not inspire confidence
ENERGY L. REP. ff 3032 (1957). At 0.9 mills/kwh for plutonium at $12/gm this
comes to $1.15 billion. While the Davis-Roddis estimates may be optimistic as

to time, there is little doubt that nuclear capacities of the magnitude predicted

will be reached at some time.
39. AToimIC INDUSTRIAL FORUm, INC., GROWTH SURVEY, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 10. See also testimony of Michael Michaelis, 202 Hearings, op. cit. supra
note 33, at 127.
40. Davis, early this year, referred to the $12/gm price as a "guess that it
will be worth $12/gm as a fuel for reactors when this use becomes technically
and economically feasible." NucLEoNics 99 (Jan. 1958).
41. Section 2076 authorizes a seven year guarantee. AEC early this year,
however, proposed a fifteen year guarantee for plutonium from foreign reactors. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMnc ENERGY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss. AIVIENDING
THE ATO c ENERGY ACT OF 1954, at 9, 14-18 (1958). The proposal was not
acted on by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. If there is to be a guarantee a good argument can be made for a longer period than seven years. The
existing guarantee period is inadequate to provide effective assurance to those
now deciding to construct a reactor, since it will cover only two or three years

of effective operation.
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that the present $30 minimum price is soundly based.4 The AEC has
stated an intention to reduce that price, at some unstated time in the
future to something like $12 per gram.43 The AEC's own uncertainty is
reflected in its failure to extend its guarantee from 1963 to 1965.
(2) The AEC's statutory monopoly of fissionable material has another important consequence. Since reactor operators cannot own
fissionable material, the AEC leases such material at an annual charge
of four per cent. Assuming that the normal return on investment to a
privately owned utility is about 10.5 per cent" it would seem that
the lease system results in a significant cost saving to the operator.
Since a typical fuel inventory may well exceed $10 million, the annual
saving may be very substantial4 5
(3) Another important element in fuel costs is the cost of chemical
reprocessing of spent fuel. The AEC has undertaken to contract for
the performance of such processing services until June 1967 at fixed
prices." This guarantee is an important form of assistance regardless
of the prices established. Moreover, the prices are based, not on the
AEC's actual costs of performing these services, but on the calculated
cost of performing them in a hypothetical plant-not built, and perhaps never to be built-assumed to operate at full capacity. The unreal
quality of these prices is indicated by the statement of one commenplant
tator that "the processes selected by the AEC for its conceptual 47
may prove to be uneconomical or even infeasible in actual use."
(4) By section 170 of the act, Congress has directed the AEC to
enter into contracts with all licensees indemnifying them against
42. The AEC in 1955 established a price on a sliding scale from $45 to
$12/gm, depending on the quality of the material. It announced a flat $12
minimum price for domestic and foreign plutonium. Finally, in May, 1957
it established a $30 price for domestic plutonium, which was a floor up to
July, 1962 and a flat price thereafter. CCH AToImc ENERGY L. REP. I[2802
(1957).
43. In announcing its current price AEC said: "It is the expectation of the
Commission that the prices for plutonium will be reduced, as dictated by consideration of the value of the material for its intended use and giving such
weight to the actual cost of producing the material as the Commission finds to
be equitable, to a level based upon the fuel value of the plutonium in commercial power reactor facilities." CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. REP. ff 2802 (1957).
This year, however, Commissioner Vance indicated that as long as AEC in
fact continued to use plutonium for weapons purposes it would continue to
pay a weapons price. 202 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 33, at 63.
44. See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Panel on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, vol. 2, Background Material, p. 21 (1955).
45. The PRDC inventory, including material in the reactor, being fabricated,
being processed, and in transportation, is about $18 million.
46. CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. REP. ff 2798 (1957).
47. Ullman, Economics of the Fuel Cycle: Reprocessing, MANAGEMENT AND
ATOMIC ENERGY 416 (1958). Another commentator has calculated that a realistic estimate of the cost of performing these services in a privately owned
plant might be five times what AEC has charged. NUcLEONICS 52 (Jan. 1958).
Significantly, the AEC has thus far been unsuccessful in obtaining satisfactory
proposals for the private construction of a chemical processing plant, despite
its willingness to guarantee a minimum load.
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third party liability. The indemnity is in the amount of $500 million,
over and above available insurance protection. There is a limitation of
liability to that amount. This form of protection to a segment of
private industry is without precedent, so far as I am aware. The cost
to the licensee is nominal-30 a year per 1,000 kw capacity or $3,000
for a 100,000 kw reactor. This cost cannot be compared with private
insurance rates, because the private insurance industry was unable to
confer protection in such an amount, regardless of premium.
THE ACCELERATION CONTROVERSY
Most of the debates on the civilian power program since 1954 have
centered around the issue whether the program should be accelerated.
That issue has served as the focal point for questions, not only of fiscal
policy and optimum technological rate of progress, but even more importantly, of public versus private power development, subsidy, and
the role of the executive and legislative branches of government.
A. The Need for Acceleration
In 1953 and 1954 there was a tendency to think that economic nuclear power was just around the corner. Some private utility officials
were saying that they were prepared to build demonstration power
reactors with no federal support of any kind.48 In 1955, the chairman
and former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
severely criticized the AEC for offering to assist licensed reactor projects without waiting to determine whether an adequate number of
49
private projects could be constructed without federal assistance.
Subsequently, however, actual experience with the engineering
problems involved led to a reevaluation of both costs and time schedules. Construction cost estimates rose markedly;5 0 fuel costs, once
hopefully thought to be zero or less, appeared to be several times coal
52
costs;51 time schedules were postponed, in some cases several years.
Following the initial announcement in 1955 of five large scale reactors
to be constructed with substantial non-AEC contributions, the utilities
48. See, e.g., statement of Walker Cisler in 1953, quoted in 202 Hearings, op.

cit. supra note 33, at 63.

49. 202 Hearings 155-80 (1955), e.g., Senator Anderson: "You are not trying
to find out if industry is going ahead. You are saying to industry, 'Don't put
up your own money, because if you just wait, we will come along and give
you part of it.'" Id. at 157.
50. See 202 Hearings 690-95 (1957). Some of the more extreme increases,
there shown, in millions of dollars were:
PWR
Consumers
Consol. Ed.

1955 Estimate

1957 Estimate

47.75
25.1
55.0

70.0
38.6
70.0

51. ATomivc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., GROWTH SURVEY, Op. cit. supra note 31,

at 30 treats a 115% increase as typical. See also p. 204 and note 32 supra.
52. See note 46 supra.
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appeared to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Meanwhile increasing
indications were coming in of the vigor and magnitude of the British
and other foreign reactor programs. 53 These facts led to an increasing
concern over the adequacy of the U. S. program.
The controversy over an accelerated program reached its peak in
1956 when the Gore-Holifield bill was unanimously reported out by
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) and narrowly defeated in the House.4 Since that time the acceleration issue has
arisen, not in connection with substantive legislation, 55 but on the
annual authorization bill. With an expansion by the AEC of its own
program and a moderation by the JCAE of its position, it appeared
possible in 1958 that agreement between the AEC and the JCAE
could be reached on a power program.5 6 However, at the end of the
session the JCAE chairman and vice-chairman issued a staff report of
a proposed expanded civilian nuclear power program calling for
construction by 1965 of an additional one million kw of plants not
already under construction or implemented, at an estimated cost of
57
$125 million annually.
In fact, the civilian power program, under the pressure both of congressional prodding and of events, has expanded markedly in magni53. The following figures of installed capacity in megawatts by the end of

the year stated were recently given by Great Britain in reply to a U. N.

questionnaire. 1961: 725 MVW; 1963: 2,400 MW; 1965: 6,000 MW. UNITED
NATIONS, EcoNorMc APPLICATION OF AToMIc ENERGY 59 (1957). The announced
target of the six Euratom countries is 15,000 MW by 1967. A TARGET FOR EURATOM, REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE EUROPEAN ATOMIc ENERGY COMMuTNIY MAY 7, 1957. These figures compare with 1,300 MW now under construction or planned in the United States for completion by 1963.
A Soviet scientist in 1956 announced a program calling for 2,400 to 2,500
MW capacity by 1960. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on Accelerating Civilian Reactor Program, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1956).
The Soviet Report to the U.N. merely refers to four reactors with a total
capacity of 765 MW, UNITED NATIONS, op. cit. supra at 58. However, USSR
representatives at the 1958 Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of the Atom
described as still valid the ambitious program announced in 1956.
54. S.REP. No. 2390, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); 102 Cong. Rec. 13038 (1956).
As reported the bill would have directed AEC to build and operate 3 "large
scale" demonstration reactors and 2 smaller (10-20 MW) prototype reactors,
and would have authorized appropriations of $400 million for the purpose.
55. The Gore-Holifield bill was reintroduced in the 85th Congress but died
in committee.
56. The fiscal year 1959 authorization bill as reported out included one major
project-a dual purpose plutonium production reactor at $145 million-not
requested by AEC. The bill was reported unanimously; it passed the House
without objection or dissent, characterized as "an effort by the members of
the Joint Committee to bury past differences of personality and policy and
to reach agreement"; in the Senate only the dual purpose feature of the
production reactor was seriously debated. However, in signing the bill the
President sharply criticized a number of its features as "unsound" and as
"discouraging private proposals."
57. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSED
EXPANDED CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM (Comm. Print 1958).
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tude.58 The AEC estimates that it will spend over $200 million in fiscal
year 1959 directly for civilian power reactor development. 59 Federal
spending of this magnitude for research and development for the benefit of one segment of American industry appears to be without precedent.60
It is clear that the present program constitutes a forced-draft approach, designed to accelerate U. S. atomic power development at a
61
rate faster than normal economic considerations would warrant.
The costs of the program are borne primarily by taxpayers and utility
ratepayers.62 The purpose of this development is not to produce a new
commodity, but to provide an alternative means of producing an exist58. AEC lists the following as direct costs of the straight AEC program

through fiscal year 1957 (in millions of dollars):

FiscalYear
1948-50
1951
1952
1953
1954

Res. and Dev.
2.2
3.2
5.9
10.0
18.0

Construction
0.9
1.9
0.4
0.1

Total
3.1
5.1
6.3
10.1
18.9

1955

26.3

2.1

28.4

1956
1957

45.8
56.7

9.4
33.3

55.2
90.0

169.0

48.1

217.1

Cumulative

Source: 19 AEC SEmiANN. REP. 32 (1956), 22 AEC SEMEANN. REP. 455 (1957);
AEC Div. of Finance (1958-59); these figures do not include supporting research and development.
The comparable figures for Research and Development for FYs 1958 and
1959 are as follows: FY 1958 (actual): $71.5; FY 1959 (est.): $95.4.
59. See p. 200 and note 19 supra. By contrast the current level of industry
spending for atomic power research and development has been estimated at
$60-$80 million annually. ATovuc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., GROWTH SURVEY,
op. cit. supranote 31, at 22.
60. See note 20 supra.
61. "Thus, we are faced with a situation where the majority is convinced
that we should not let the natural forces of a free economy decide the future
of technical development. I am sure, however, that there are many people
who have grave doubts as to whether history will approve this course. It
seems that even those who are unsympathetic to the idea are bowing to the
inevitable, so to speak, and rather than vigorously opposing an accelerated
program are doing what they can to guide it in the direction they hope will
be least disturbing to the domestic economy which eventually will have to
assimilate this new technological development." Address by Fred W. Argue,
Vice President, Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., printed in Proceedings
of a Conference Sponsored by Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. and National
Industrial Conference Board, MANAGEMENT AND AToivuc ENERGY 57-58 (1958).

62. The bulk of the spending on atomic power development is by the government. Between 3/4 and 5/6 of the industrial spending is by utilities.
AToMIc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., GROWTH SURVEY, op. cit. supra note 31, at 22.
Part or all of the remainder may ultimately be passed on by manufacturers to
their utility customers. By contrast, development costs associated with conventional power plants are usually borne initially by the manufacturers, and
passed on to the utilities as part of the cost of hardware purchased by them.
State regulatory bodies have generally allowed private utilities to express
in their rate structures the costs of atomic power development (including excess capital costs over a conventional plant). See, e.g., Duke Power Co., CCH
AToMIc ENERGY L. REP. ff 3046 (1958), citing cases in other states and the District of Columbia.
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ing commodity-electric energy. And in view of present high nuclear
costs, it is at least a moot point whether foreseeable improvements in
coal boilers and transmission techniques do not offer greater short
term promise in reducing the cost of electricity to the consumer than
63
does the development of nuclear power.
While the desirability of atomic power development is unquestioned,
the need for an accelerated program is difficult to justify by domestic
considerations. Hence it is that the argument for an accelerated program is expressed primarily in terms of considerations of international
prestige-the need to maintain world "technological leadership" and
the need of the nation which first used the atom for destruction to
emphasize to the world the depth of its concern with peaceful uses of
64
atomic energy.
B. The Public Power Controversy
It was perhaps inevitable, once the atom was shown to be capable
of producing electricity, that it, like other forms of electric power,
should become embroiled in controversy between public and private
power advocates. Whether or not this is so, the heritage of the bitter
controversy over the so-called Dixon-Yates contract, and the continued
presence as chairmen of the AEC and Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy of two of the chief protagonists in that controversy, made it
inevitable. More than any other factor, this public power controversy
has colored the acceleration fight.
The 1954-1956 AEC power program was characterized by a complete
dependence on private industry to decide what full-scale demonstration reactors should be built, at what locations and on what time
schedules. The AEC proposed to construct no such reactor itself. And
its first two invitations for cooperative proposals did not specify or
even suggest any particular type of reactor as being appropriate, in
63. "In the past 17 years the cost of conventional power in terms of stable
dollars has come down 50 per cent .... There is every reason to believe
that.., another 17 years is going to again show a remarkable improvement."
AEC Commissioner Vance, AUTHoRIzATioN HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 4, at
226-27. A study in 1955, however, concluded, with respect to coal plants, "it is
believed that the major benefits of cost reduction through simplified plant
design have been exploited and that future improvements will about offset the
increased cost of equipment." McKinney Panel, Background Material p. 14.
64. See, e.g., AuTHoRIzATIoN HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 223; JOINT
COMMITTEE ON" ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSED EXPANDED
CiviLIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM 3-4 (1958); Arden House Report,

supra

note 7, at 153. Even now, some 83% of AEC's budget goes for military purposes. Hearing Before House Committee on Appropriations on Supplemental
AppropriationBill, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 907 (1958).

A further consideration, sometimes stated, is the desire to maintain a strong
competitive position in the world market for American manufacturers. One
manufacturer, however, has stated that even with such federal support "it is
quite clear . . . to most U. S. manufacturers that the foreign market cannot

exist for us as a very long-term profitable market." Starr, The Reactor Manufacturing Industry, MANAGEMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY, at 52 (1958).
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the AEC's technical judgment, for prototype construction.65 These
actions of the AEC reflected an avowed judgment that industry was
"in much better position than the Commission" to determine which
reactors were suitable for prototype construction. 66
In addition, while the AEC's power demonstration contracts typically obligated the proposer to construct the reactor and operate it for
five years, neither the invitation nor the contract prescribed any
completion dates.67 Thus it appeared that the AEC had completely
surrendered the direction and control of the prototype stage of its
program, both as to technical decisions and timing, to the utilities.
The Gore-Holifield acceleration bill was a reaction to this surrender
-a reassertion of governmental direction to the program. 68 Some of
its proponents undoubtedly questioned whether the utility industry
genuinely intended to proceed vigorously with its projects or merely
proposed them as stalking horses to stave off a competitive government program.6 9 And some may have seen an opportunity to establish
such a competitive program.
As introduced, the Gore-Holifield bill would have required the AEC
to build six full-scale reactors, and provided that in selecting their
sites the AEC should consider the "need for additional electric generating capacity in this region of the site under consideration." It thus
clearly contemplated sale to the public of the power produced. The
bill was amended by the Joint Committee, however, to provide that
the reactors should be built at AEC installations and the power used
by the AEC and not sold. This has set the pattern. Subsequent authorization bills, in providing for AEC construction of reactors, have uni65. CCH AToMIc ENERGY L. REP. ff 3021, 3022. The second round invitation did specify size using fuel with a low enrichment of U-235, and reactors
of relatively advanced design.
The failure of the AEC to identify reactor types suitable for prototype
construction had especially unfortunate consequences in the second round.
The first round proposers had acquired a considerable familiarity with nuclear
engineering through an AEC study program, operating since 1951; their proposals were for reactors already fairly well developed by AEC and extensively studied by the proposer. The second round utility proposers generally
had no prior knowledge of nuclear technology. Many of them were induced
by AEC's invitation to propose relatively advanced types of reactors. Thus
out of seven proposals, two (Mt. Holyoke and Orlando) were rejected by AEC
as too advanced; a third (Wolverine) was abandoned by the proposer, in part
because of difficulties experienced in AEC's own homogeneous reactor program;
a fourth (Chugach) was a novel concept the fundamental feasibility of which
is still being tested.
66. AEC report on the Gore-Holifield bill, Accelerating Hearings, op. cit.
supranote 53, at 69.
67. See, e.g., The PRDC Contract, AEC Docket No. F-16, Acker Exhibit
19-A.
68. Thus Senator Anderson said: 'qt raises a fundamental question of
whether AEC has abdicated some of its responsibilities to private industry."
Accelerating Hearings, op. cit. supra note 53, at 4.
69. Compare Senator Anderson's recent reference to the existence in the
past of some question "as to the good faith .. .of private organizations."
AUTHoRIZATION HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 432.
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formly provided that the power generated shall be used by the AEC
and not sold, and that the reactor, after it has served research, development and defense uses, shall be either sold or dismantled. 0 Proponents of acceleration also explicitly disavowed any intent to promote
a public power program.71
These attempts to avoid a public power issue could not, in the nature
of things, succeed wholly. For once reactors are built and operating,
it might not be difficult to remove the restrictions on the sale of power
and the requirement of dismantling. Hence, proposals for government
construction of large scale reactors tended, regardless of these restrictions, to be attacked as "socialistic" and as an "opening wedge" towards putting the government in the power business.7 2
For a time the vigor of this fight over public power threatened to
obscure all other considerations. But a compromise was at hand
which, it may be hoped, will reduce the emphasis on the public power
issue.
At the hearings on the Gore-Holifield bill in 1956, the AEC announced a new policy to accelerate its program. This was that whenever the AEC decided that a concept reached the stage of development
where construction of a prototype was appropriate, it would invite
proposals for construction of that specified type and, receiving none,
would request funds to build it itself. 73 Since then, AEC invitations
for cooperative proposals have invariably specified certain types of
reactors which the AEC would build itself unless a suitable private
proposal was received calling for construction by a specified date.74
Thus the AEC has retaken an essential element of program direction.
On the other hand, there is a growing tendency for Congress, in requiring the AEC to build a particular type of reactor, to provide that
75
the AEC shall first solicit proposals for a cooperative arrangement.
Under this pattern the need for a particular reactor on a particular
70. E.g., Fiscal Year 1958 Authorization Act, 71 Stat. 409 (1957); 1959 Authorization Act, 72 Stat. 490 (1958).
71. E.g., Senator Gore, Accelerating Hearings,op. cit. supra note 53, at 11, 13.
72. See, e.g., the minority report on the 1957 authorization act, H.R. REP.
No. 978, S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The opposition may also
have been reacting to the fact that public power organizations supported
these proposals.
73. Accelerating Hearings,op. cit. supra note 53, at 39, 69.
74. See the Third Round Invitation, Jan. 7, 1957, CCH AToMIc ENERGY L.
REP. I[
3023 (1957); the Gas-cooled Reactor Invitation, Sept. 21, 1958, id. 113023.
See § 111 (f) of the 1958 Authorization Act, 71 Stat. 409 (1957), which requires the AEC to announce publicly the reactor types which "it considers
techncally desirable for construction" and to specify completion and other
dates. The November 17, 1958 amendment to the Third Round Invitation states
that the AEC will only consider proposals for reactor projects which it has
specified; in specifying projects it will consider recommendations by industry.
75. Fiscal Year 1958 Authorization Act, § 110, 71 Stat. 409 (1957); 1959
Authorization Act, § 110, 72 Stat. 490 (1958).
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time schedule can now be decided without regard to who builds it.
And the question who builds it is made to turn largely on fiscal
considerations, a satisfactory cooperative proposal involving less cost
to the government will be accepted in preference to government
construction, but if no such proposal is obtained the Government will
construct the reactor. This compromise, together with the appointment
to the AEC of a new chairman and two new Commissioners, may
herald an "era of good feeling" in which public power issues will, at
76
least for a time, be subordinate.
C. The Problem of Subsidies
With this de-emphasis on the public "power issue will probably come
an increased emphasis on the issue of subsidies, or assistance payments. In fact, of course, the two are closely related, for the ability of
private utility and manufacturing companies to enter into cooperative
proposals for prototype reactor construction may depend on the contribution which the federal government is able and willing to make
to such cooperative projects. Given present rising nuclear costs, and
fairly general agreement by the nuclear industry on a need for further acceleration, it is not surprising that industrial representatives
77
are now asking for a greater measure of governmental assistance.
Expansion of straight AEC research and development presents no
legal problems. But the possibilities for further expansion of assistance under the cooperative program may be limited by two features of
the Atomic Energy Act. The first is section 44 which provides that in
disposing of energy produced at "experimental utilization facilities
of the Commission," preference must be given to "public bodies and
cooperatives." The second is section 169, under which the AEC, at
least as a matter of policy, will not pay any part of the cost of construction or operation of a privately owned, licensed facility. The net
effect of these two provisions, as presently applied by the AEC, is that
the AEC can contribute directly to the cost of construction and operation of reactors under the cooperative program only by (a) taking
title to part or all of the facility, (b) treating it as an AEC facility and
not a licensed facility, and (c) disposing of the energy from it under
76. Compare, e.g., the strenuous effort of the JCAE and the AEC to arrive
at an agreed program, Senator Anderson's invitation "to let the dead past
bury its dead and go on to happier days." AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS, op. Cit.
supra note 31, at 432, and the statement of AEC's new chairman that "I am
not persuaded by the fact that in a matter of this kind, which is in an experimental stage, a developmental stage, that the question of public and private
power is particularly overriding in its power. Perhaps down the road a ways
it will be. I am not so sure that it is right now." Quoted in ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL
FORUM, INc., FORUM MEMO 4 (July 1958).

77. Recent polls of utilities and manufacturers interested in atomic energy
show a large majority of manufacturers and about 50% of utilities in favor
of accelerating the program and in favor of additional federal assistance.
ATOmIc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., FORUM MEMO 16-17 (Feb. 1958); NUCLEONICS

18 (Feb. 1958).
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the preference provisions of the act. Hence AEC direct contributions
to construction and operating costs have occurred, and are likely to
occur, only in projects involving publicly and cooperatively owned
8
utilities.7
At the Eighty-fifth Congress two bills were introduced to provide
for grants to private utilities of amounts based on the difference between -the construction and operating costs of conventional facilities
and those of nuclear facilities. 9 Similar assistance was suggested as
a possibility in the recent JCAE staff report, which also pointed out
that "any such types of assistance would involve consideration of
revisions of sections 44 and 169 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. , 80
The preference provision of section 2064 is deeply rooted in the
history of United States power legislation.8 ' Although it has been
vigorously objected to from time to time by private utility interests,
the likelihood that it will be deleted or limited in scope seems nil.
There are possibilities, however, for both amendment and reinterpretation of the "no subsidy" provision of section 169.
Section 169 provides in full:
No Subsidy. No funds of the Commission shall be employed in the construction or operation of facilities licensed under Section 103 or 104 of
this title except under contract or other arrangement entered into pursuant to Sec. 31.
This would appear to mean that any contract or arrangement authorized by section 31 is exempt from the probitions ,of section 169. Thus
section 169 would permit the grant of direct AEC assistance in construction and operation of a licensed reactor if that assistance could
be justified as a means of providing for the conduct of research and
development activities looking towards the demonstration of competi78. The PWR project was entered into prior to the effective date of the 1954
act and hence disposition of energy from it by contract to a private utility
without a prior offer to public and cooperative groups was legally possible.
Such an arrangement might also be possible in an area in which there were
no public or cooperative bodies capable of exercising their preference rights.
Even then, AEC might have to retain the right to offer the power to preference
groups at a later time should any become eligible. Compare 41 Ops. ATT'Y GEN.
36 (1955).
79. H.R. REP. No. 7472, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 8191, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1958). Both died in committee.
80. Supra note 5 at 12. Senator Anderson hps recently proposed "a grant of
perhaps not to exceed 90 percent of the estimated difference between the cost
of the nuclear plant and a conventional plant of the same output." AUTHORIZATION

HEARNs, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 431.

An alternative formula for assistance might be patterned on the Euratom
Cooperation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1084, section 4 of which authorizes the AEC
to guarantee the reactor operator, for a 10-year period of operation, against
fuel cycle costs in excess of a stated amount. Such a guarantee would, presumably, be limited to reactors constructed by certain dates, which promised
to make a contribution to the development program, and as to which a need
for the guaranty was shown.
81. See Marks, supra note 15.
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tive nuclear power, and was granted pursuant to contractual arrangements entailing an appropriate consideration moving to the Commission and containing the provisions relating to health, safety, inspection, reporting and patent rights required by sections 31 and 152.
There is no relevant published legislative history on section 2209.
In 1955, however, the chairman and former chairman of the JCAE
relied on excerpts from unpublished committee proceedings to support
a different view-that the only thing permitted by the "except" clause
in section 169 is a contract, entered into after the reactor is built, for
the performance in the reactor of specific research and development
for the Commission. Two other members of the JCAE sharply dis82
puted this interpretation.
Faced with this conflict of opinion, the AEC, without abandoning
the legal interpretation of section 169 stated above, arrived at a practical modus vivendi under which it has restricted its assistance to
licensed projects to specific research and development and waiver of
charges, and has declined to contribute directly to the cost of construction or operation. 83 It may be, however, that, particularly in view
of the opportunities for congressional review afforded by the authorization process, the AEC would now feel free to apply section 169
according to its literal terms, and the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy would not contest such an application.8 Alternatively, a
clarifying amendment to section 169 might be considered.
As an alternative to such direct payment of construction and operating costs, some have advocated a deliberate revision of the AEC's
82. 202 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 39, at 155-76. This split crossed party
lines, Senator Anderson (D) and Congressman Cole (R) against Senator
Hickenlooper (R) and Congressman Holifield (D). A more unlikely alignment could hardly be conceived.
83. The dividing line between research and development costs, and construction and operation costs is not always easy to draw in a developmental project.
AEC has, however, leaned over backwards by refusing to pay for any "hard-

ware" incorporated into the reactor, even though the item may be developmental in character, and by confining its assistance during the operating
period to specific research and development clearly separate from the experimental operation of the reactor plant.
84. The views expressed in the two foregoing paragraphs are stated more
fully in the memorandum of William Mitchell, AEC General Counsel, reprinted
in 103 Cong. Rec. 9128 (1957) and in my remarks in MANAGEMENT AND AToMic
ENERGY 157-59 (July 1957). A further advantage of this position is that it
would permit the government-owned projects under the cooperative program
to be handled under license, and hence would ensure the application to those
projects of the requirements for report by the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards and public hearing imposed by §§ 182 (b) and 189 (a) of the act.
The desirability of this course is suggested by the recent concern over the
selection of sites for the Piqua and Chugach projects. See as to Piqua, AEC
Release No. A-240, Sept. 9, 1958; CCH AToMc ENERGY L. REP. 1 9753 (1958);
and as to Chugach, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on
Review of Proposals Under Power Demonstration Program, 85th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1958).
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85
prices and charges relating to fuel costs so as to reduce net fuel costs.
The provisions relating to the establishment of those prices and
charges contain sufficient flexibility to confer a considerable measure
of discretion on the AEC. But the underlying concept of a "fair"
price would appear to prohibit a deliberately subsidized price. Moreover, the pricing provisions of the act must be read in conjunction
with section 169, and when so read the conclusion is clear that subsidized prices and charges may not be used as an indirect means of
paying for the cost of construction and operation of licensed reactors.
Thus a proposal for deliberate use of those prices and charges as a subsidy would require legislation.
The argument against the use of AEC prices and charges as a deliberate form of assistance is, I submit, overwhelming. In the first
place, while the other two forms of assistance discussed at pages 199203 of this article can be specifically tailored to meet the needs of the
present research and development period, a system of subsidized prices
and charges, once established, would be very difficult to disestablish. 80
Thus this form of assistance, unlike the other two, threatens to perpetuate itself into the period of economically competitive operations,
and permanently to distort the comparative economics of nuclear and
other fuels. Second, prices and charges must, by their nature and by
the terms of the act, be applied across the board, regardless of the
merits or need of a particular project, whereas assistance of the other
two types can be geared to the specific needs of a research and development program. 87 Third, the cost of assistance conferred through
subsidized prices and charges is concealed and difficult to determine;
the cost of assistance conferred through the other two means is
specifically identified and, since it requires appropriation of funds, is
subject to annual congressional review. Fourth, assistance granted
through the prices and charges route does not result in the grant to
the Government of any rights to information and patents. Fifth, subsidized prices and charges may seriously distort the development of
nuclear technology by unduly encouraging types of reactors which
have high-cost fuel cycles or produce large amounts of plutonium.
Government assistance-or subsidization-is justifiable if the
amount of assistance is clearly identified, and reasonably related to
specific research and development needs. But concealed subsidies,
which threaten a permanent distortion of reactor economics, are unjustifiable. Hence the sound course, I submit, is to reject proposals
85. Testimony of Michael Michaelis, 202 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 33, at
126.
86. Compare the enormous difficulty of loosening up the rigid agricultural
parity system.
87. For example, the AEC would be unlikely, under the straight program or
the cooperative program, to support ten "Chinese copies" of the PWR; deliberate adoption of subsidized prices and charges could have that result.
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for deliberately subsidized prices and charges, and also to take all
necessary action to ensure that existing prices and charges are not
subsidized.
Congress has taken one step along this direction by requiring that
any new prices established by the AEC for purchase of special nuclear
material must lay before the JCAE for forty-five days before becoming
effective. Thus far, the AEC has avoided the application of this provision by not extending its plutonium price guarantees. But such
laying before Congress-with the possibility of congressional hearings
-is not an effective substitute for action by the AEC to satisfy itself
and the public that all of its important prices and charges are soundly
based. It would be a salutory step for the AEC, in the future, to treat
those of its prices and charges which have major economic importance
as if they were rule-making actions under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act; to issue such prices and charges in proposed
form for public comment; to make available necessary background
data to permit informed comment; and to hold public hearings where
the comments received indicate any serious doubts about the sound88
ness of the proposed action.
Ultimately a more drastic solution may be necessary. As long as
the AEC is both supplier and customer of nuclear materials, the possibility of large subsidies is inherent. The elimination of this inherent
possibility would require amending the Atomic Energy Act to eliminate the AEC's statutory monopoly of fissionable material. Such a step
would require careful study, since the constitutionality of the AEC's
regulatory provisions has sometimes been thought to rest on continued
government ownership of fissionable material, so as to bring into play
the powers of Congress over property of the United States.89 But it
would be unfortunate for many reactors to go into operation in reliance on the continued availability for the indefinite future of uranium
at a 4 per cent lease charge and of a government market for plutonium.
Hence it would be salutary for the AEC or the JCAE or both to indicate that the present situation is temporary only, and that the possibility of eliminating the Government's statutory monopoly of fission88. To the extent that the underlying data is classified Restricted Data,
AEC should declassify it if possible; if that is impossible it has available the
resources of its Access Program, 10 C.F.R. Part 20 (Supp. 1958) and its parallel
procedures, for handling comments and hearings on a classified basis, 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.800-2.814 (Supp. 1958).

89. U. S. Const. art. IV, § 3. See S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954).
It is difficult to see how Congress has any greater power to prohibit private
ownership of fissionable material than it has to regulate it and hence it is by
no means clear that the retention of ownership has real constitutional importance.
Statutory amendment is not the whole answer, since the government may
for a long time be the sole producer of enriched uranium. Eventually, however,, reactor produced plutonium should reduce the importance of enriched
uranium as a fuel.
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able material-and hence its status as lessor and compulsory purchaser of such material-is under active consideration.
In short, most of the concern about subsidies has, in my judgment, been misplaced. It has been focused on the cooperative program.
But in essence, the cooperative program is a way of getting development done at less cost to the AEC than by direct government construction. It is also a means of easing the transition from a government program to a truly private program. So long as the private contribution
is at least equal to the costs of a conventional plant, and the information and patent rights from the project are made available to the AEC
without restriction, it is difficult to find a serious subsidy problem.90
On the other hand, the continued furnishing and purchase by the AEC
of important materials and services inherently involves subsidies
which are not limited to a transitional period. To the extent that relaxation of the limitations on assistance to cooperative projects would
release the pressure now building up for subsidized fuel prices, it
would reduce, rather than increase, the possibilities for subsidy under
the act.
D. Role of the Executive and Legislative Branches
Prior to 1954, while there had been some congressional prodding to
accelerate reactor development, 91 Congress did not attempt to impose
requirements as to program direction. The years since 1953, however,
have seen a startling increase in assertion of congressional direction.
This increase has been accomplished through the appropriation process. The 1954 act materially increased the control of the JCAE over
the AEC appropriations by providing, in section 261, that all appropriations for construction of new "facilities" must first be authorized
by Congress. 2 In 1957, following a vehement attack by the chairman
of the House Appropriations Committee on the workings of the
new system, 93 Congress further tightened up its review of the AEC
program by amending section 261 to require (1) that appropriations
for civilian "experimental" power projects, which the AEC had been
90. There would seem to be more danger of subsidy in the provisions for

forced sale of government owned reactors contained in §§ 110 and 111 (a) (1)
of the Fiscal Year 1958 Authorization Act, 71 Stat. 409 (1957); and § 110 of
the Fiscal Year 1959 Authorization Act, 72 Stat. 490 (1958).
91. See reports cited in S. REP. No. 2390, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956). The
AEC's announcement of its Five Year Reactor Program, published in 1953,
resulted from a demand by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for a
statement of the program.
92. Thus the appropriation has to be reviewed by two sets of congressional
committees; the authorization bill goes to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and the appropriation bill to the appropriations committees. In view
of the JCAE's greater familiarity with the AEC program this results in a
substantial increase in effective legislative control.
93. 103 CONG. REc. 5189 (1957). Mr. Durham's attack was directed to the
legality of prior activities; the answering legal arguments stated in Mr.
Mitchell's memorandum, 103 CONG. REC. 9128 (1957), apparently satisfied most,
if not all of the JCAE members.
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placing in its operating rather than its construction budget, must
receive specific authorization, and (2) that appropriations for cooperative projects must receive authorization. 4 The 1958 Authorization
Act, enacted shortly thereafter, required the AEC, before entering
into a cooperative arrangement, to lay the basis of the arrangement
before the Joint Committee for 45 days.95
The new authorization procedure, as it has been applied in 1957 and
1958, raises several questions as to the proper scope of the legislative
function as it relates to program direction:
(1) Determination of types of reactors to be built. One of the Joint
Committee's complaints has concerned the failure of the AEC to
formulate and publish a long range program, with reactor types, sizes
and time schedules. 6 The AEC made one such formulation in 1953
in response to a JCAE request. 97 A similar formulation was submitted
by the AEC in 1958, again in response to a JCAE request.9 Subsequently, the JCAE staff prepared its own program formulation as a
basis for discussion at the next Congress. 99
In 1957, the JCAE reported out an authorization bill which would
have directed the AEC to construct (1) "a natural uranium graphitemoderated gas-cooled reactor, 40,000 kilowatts," and (2) a "plutonium
recycle reactor experiment, 15,000 kilowatts equivalent," and to perform preliminary studies on a plutonium production reactor. The
Committee report'00 further specified various technical features of
these projects, and even went so fai as to designate the location, contractor, and branch chief within the AEC who should be responsible.' 0 '
94. The act also required a laying before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy of new plutonium prices, and of any proposed waivers of fuel and
other charges.
95. These provisions, and their effect, particularly in requiring resubmittal
to the JCAE of amendments to the arrangement, were ably discussed in an
address by Trowbridge, "Implications of Authorization Legislation for AEC's
Power Reactor Development Program," at the Fortieth Annual Conference of
the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., New York City, Oct. 29, 1957.
96. Industrial groups, technical experts and other have often joined in this
criticism of AEC. E.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, AUTHORIZATION
HEARINGS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1958); NUCLEONICS 10, 17 (Feb. 1958);
AToMIc INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., FORUM MEMO. 14, 16 (Feb. 1958); ATOMS FOR
POWER: UNITED STATES POLICY IN ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 159 (1957)

(Arden House Report).

97. JCAE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, FIVE YEAR POWER
REACTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PROPOSED BY THE AEC, 83D CONGRESS, 2D SESS.

(Comm. Print 1954).

98. AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS, op. cit. supra note 96, at 206, 214.
99. See note 5 supra.
100. H.R. REP. No. 978, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
101. The report said it was "essential" that the gas-cooler reactor "be
assigned to the Naval Reactors Branch under Admiral Rickover" and "carried
on by the [Westinghouse] industrial organization at Bettis"; it referred to
"the availability of the AEC installation at Bettis, and Idaho." Id. at 26-27.
It referred to work done by General Electric at Hanford, Wash. on the plutonium recycle concept and said "it would appear appropriate that the experimental recycle reactor be constructed there." Id. at 29. It also referred to
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However, before the act was passed the gas-cooled reactor project was
reduced to a study. The 1959 Authorization Act required the AEC to
build a plutonium production reactor, "convertible type," notwithstanding administrative opposition both to the reactor and to its
"convertible" power-producing features. It also specified several design studies of particular concepts not requested by the AEC.
The level of effort and expenditure is clearly a proper matter for
congressional determination under its appropriation power. There
would also not appear to be any objection to the formulation, by the
committee or its staff, of suggested programs as a basis for discussion.
Congressional directions to the AEC to build reactors of specified types
and characteristics, however, present a different question; while such
directions may at times be justified, they invite individuals whose
advice has not been acted on by the AEC, or who have been unsuccessful in selling a proposal to the AEC, to have a second bite at the
cherry before the JCAE.102 And congressional designation of partic-

ular contractors is a clear invasion of the executive function.
(2) Review of individual contracts. The provision of the authoriza-

tion act for laying before the Joint Committee the basis for cooperative arrangements was patterned on section 169 of the 1954 act,
requiring a similar laying before the Joint Committee of certain contracts by which the AEC bought utility services. In adopting that
section, Congress made clear that it did not intend to require Joint
Committee "approval" of such contracts, but merely to give Congress
an opportunity by legislation to withdraw the authority to make such
a contract. Congress clearly sought to avoid the constitutional problems which would be raised by a grant of authority to a congressional
committee to validate or invalidate a contract; 103 it recognized that
"writing a contract is executive in nature rather than legislative.' 10 4
These principles have at times been lost sight of in subsequent years.
Thus the fiscal year 1958 authorization bill prescribed in some detail
the nature of the contractual arrangements on the basis of which the
Hanford (and by implication G. E. as contractor) as the desirable location for
the production reactor. Id. at 25. The Commission followed this admonition
in two cas~s but it assigned the gas-cooled reactor project (reduced to a study
when the Act was passed) to its Civilian Power Reactors Branch, and awarded
the study contract to Kaiser Engineers.
The JCAE minority properly objected to these expressions in the Report as
"improper favoritism and rank discrimination by legislative fiat," id. at 52;
and as putting the Joint Committee "in the place of the Commission in the
making of arrangements and the letting of contracts and the priority of proposals." Id. at 54.

102. For example, the Congressional directive to construct a dual purpose
plutonium reactor was supported by testimony before the JCAE of officials of
the General Electric Co., an AEC contractor which has long and unsuccessfully been urging AEC to authorize such a project.
103. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolution and Committees, 66 HARv. L. Rsv. 569 (1952).
104. E.g., 100

CONG.

REc. 11018, 11029, 11214, 11216 (1954).
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AEC was to contract with the Second Round proposers-arrangementswhich differed substantially from the basis on which the AEC and the
proposers were then negotiating. The committee report went further
and laid down "general principles" to which the AEC was expected to
adhere in its negotiations.
In addition, the Joint Committee, in its hearings on individual pro-;
posals, has on occasion come close to insisting on certain contract
changes. 105 It is true that the Committee is, nominally, merely sug10 6
gesting and not directing; it has no constitutional power to direct.
Nevertheless, just as legislative investigations of the conduct of particular regulatory cases can constitute a form of pressure on an administrative agency to take particular regulatory action, 10 7 so detailed
committee hearings on proposed contracts prior to their becoming
effective have a tendency to involve the legislative committee directly
in contract negotiations and to dilute executive responsibility for the
discharge of executive functions.
The fiscal year 1958 authorization act, and the committee report on
it, are, it may be hoped, the high water mark of legislative encroachment on the executive function. The effort noxr being made to reach
agreement on the atomic power program, and the general "era of good
feeling" in Washington on atomic power, warrant the hope that a
serious issue of executive versus legislative responsibility can be
avoided for the .uture.
E. Public Participationin Decisions on Acceleration
As noted above, the tendency now is for all issues concerning the
atomic power program to be resolved in the authorization legislation
rather than by substantive legislation. So far as the level of effort is'
concerned, this appears wholly proper. The Joint Committee report
on the 1957 amendments to section 251, however, suggests that the
authorization route be used even to make substantive amendments or
modifications to the act.10 8 Such a procedure, should it be followed,
105. For example, in the hearings on the Pennsylvania Power and Light
Proposal, some members of the Joint Committee raised questions as to the
patent rights, if any, retained by AEC in the event PPL abandoned its project
at the end of Phase I. There followed, in effect, a contract negotiation in the
hearing room with PPL offering to give AEC an additional option which AEC
accepted. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Review
of Proposals Under Power Demonstration Program 96, 98, 115 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958).
106. See note 103 supra.
107. See, e.g., address by Hon. Ralph Gwinne, Chairman, FTC, Federal
Bar Ass'n Annual Convention Washington, D.C., September, 1958.
108. "In its consideration of the various alternative methods of handling
current questions, the Joint Committee determined (except as to sec. 261
and new sec. 58) not to attempt to rewrite or clarify various substantive
provisions of the act, such as section 169 (no subsidy) section 53 (waiver
of use charges), and section 56 (establishment of prices). Rather, as explained
in this report, the Joint Committee proposes to revise the act to provide for
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would seriously dilute public participation in the legislative process,

both because the effect of the amendment is thereby obscured, and
because the participation in the authorization hearings and the hearings on particular cooperative proposals has generally been limited to
the AEC and the proposer, and has excluded other groups having an
interest in the atomic power program. 109 While the issue here suggested has not thus far arisen in clear cut fashion, it could become
significant.
CONCLUSION

If the foregoing discussion has done nothing else it has perhaps suggested two things. The first is the complexity and interrelated character of the decisions called for by the civilian power program, which
is after all only one part of the program for which the AEC and the
JCAE are responsible. Indeed it has not been possible even to mention
many issues, especially of technical judgment and contract policy,
which have played an important part in the program. The second is
that atomic energy has required exploration and development of new
techniques, not only in science and engineering, but also in government, economics and law. In these fields, as in science, there have been
experiments, some of which have succeeded and some of which have
not. Given the nature of the atomic power program in the period
1954-1958, and the background out of which it emerged, the wonder
is, not that there has been some confusion and controversy, but that
so much has been accomplished in spite of it.*
appropriate review and authorization by the Joint Committee and Congress of

atomic power projects and review of schedules of prices and criteria of waiver
of use charges before they become effective. In this manner it was intended to
permit the AEC the needed amount of flexibility and yet provide substantial
review authorization by the Congress." S. REP. No. 437, H.R. REP. No. 471, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
109. See MANAGEMENT AND ATOMIc ENERGY 170-73 (July 1958), where the

foregoing point is well developed by Joseph Volpe.
* On December 16, 1958, after the foregoing article had been set in type,
Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Westinghouse announced that the PPL
homogeneous reactor project, referred to in footnotes 45 and 48 supra, had
been abandoned. The reasons for abandonment apparently relate to technical
problems and the economic promise of the reactor. There is nothing to indicate
that the participants would have gone forward had a greater measure of AEC
assistance been available. While the press release issued by Senator Anderson
takes the view that it is inappropriate for private industry to develop "advanced reactor concepts," it also reiterates the proposal to support "private
second and third generation projects with increased Government assistance."
See note 104 supra. Hence it does not appear that the abandonment of this
project, and the Congressional reaction to it, requires any basic revision of
the conclusions expressed in this article.

